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PEOPLEV. ARANDA

[63 C.2d

[Crim. No. 9078. In Bank. Nov. 12, 1965.]

l

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN MARK
ARANDA et aI., Defendants and Appellants.
,
[la, Ib] Oriminal Law-Appeal-BeversibleError-Evidence- \',
Oonfessions.-The inadmissibility of defendant's confession of
robbery required reversal of the judgment of conviction for I
robbery where it appeared that, at the time of his confession,
investigation of the robbery had ceased to be a general inquiry ,
into an unsolved crime and had focused on him and another,
that he was taken into custody and interrogated to elicit in- .
criminating statements, and that there was no showing he was
advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent or that I,
he waived those rights.
\1

[2] Id ..,.....Appeal-Reservmg Questions-Evidence-Oonfessions.- \
Defendant's failure to object to the admission of his confession '
obtained without first advising him of his rights to counsel
and to remain silent does not preclude his raising the question
on appeal where his case was tried before the decision in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 878 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d
977].
[3] ld.-Appeal-Presumptions - Following Instructions - As to
Evidence.-It may not be assumed that error in admitting a
confession implicating codefendants is rendered harmless to
the nonconfessing defendant by an instruction that the confession should not be considered against him.
[4] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-InstructionsOonfessions.-In a prosecution of codefendants, the giving of
an instruction not to consider the confession of one defendant
in determining the guilt of a non confessing defendant and the
fact that the confession is only an accusation against the nondeclarant and thus lacks the shattering inlpact of a selfincriminatory statement preclude a holding that error in admitting the confession is always prejudicial to the nondeclarant.
[6] ld.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence-Oonfessions.-Error in adtnitting one defendant's confession implicating a
JIleK. Dig. References: [1,5]1 Criminal Law, § 1382(27); [2]
Criminal Law, § 1080(2); [3] Criminal Law, § 1285(1); [4] Criminal Law, § 1434; [6] Criminal Law, § 104.5; [7] Criminal Law,
§ 234; [8] Courts, § 94; [9] Criminal Law, §§ 234,464; [10] Criminal Law, § 1485.1; [11] Statutes, § 22; [12, 14, 15, 17] Robbery,
§ 3 [18, 19] Robbery, § 31; [16, 18] Robbery, § 39(7).
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codefendant resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Const., art.
VI, § 4%) as to the nondeclarant, despite an instruction not
to consider the confession against him, where the evidence
conflicted, both defendants denied guilt; and the prosecutor
linked the cases of the two defendants and in effect urged the
confession as evidence against the nondeclarant.
[6a,6b] ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and Inspection.-As a preliminary to a joint trial, one defendant is entitled to the statements made to the police by any codefendant.
[7a,7b] ld.-Trial-Separate Trials of Defendants Jointly Accused.-Regardless of whether it is constitutionally permissible
to permit joint trials when the confession of one defendant
implicates codefendants, the practice is prejudicial and unfair
to the non declarant defendant and must be altered.
[8] Oourts-Decisions as Precedents.-In criminal actions, where
life or liberty is at stake, courts should not adhere to precedents unjust to the accused; it is never too late to mend.
[9] Oriminal Law-Trial-Separate Trials of Defendants Jointly
Accused: Evidence-Ooniessions-Admissibility.-When the
prosecution proposes to introduce one defendant's extrajudicial
statement implicating a codefendant, the trial court must adopt
one of the following procedures: it can permit a joint trial if
all parts of the statement implicating any codefendant can
be and are effectively deleted without prejudice to the declarant; it can grant severance of trials if the prosecution
insists the extrajudieial statement must be used and it appears
that effective deletions cannot be made; if the prosecution
has successfully resisted a motion for severance and thereafter offers an extrajudicial statement implicating a codefendant, the trial court must exclude it if effective deletions are not
possible.
[10J ld.-Punishment--Oomputation of Term-Statutes.-Defendant was not deprived of due process and equal protection of
the law by the refusal to apply retroactively the 1959 amendment to Pen. Code, § 17, deeming a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or flne or imprisonment in a
county jail a misdemeanor where the court commits defendant
to the Youth Authority, since no part of the Penal Code is
retroactive unless expressly declared so (§ 3) and the amendment to § 17 docs not so declare.
[11] Statutes-Retrospective Operation.-Arefusal to apply a
statute ret1'Oactively does not violate U.S. Const., 14th Amend.,
guaranteeing due process and equal protection of the law.

,

[7] Right to severance where codefendant has incriminated himself, note, 54 A.L.R.2d 830. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 325;
Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 53 et seq.).
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[12] Bobbe1"f-DeP'ees of Bobbe1"f-Dangerous or Deadl7 WeapoD."';O~,
-In a prosecution for first degree robbery, defined under. Pen..~
Code, § 211a, as robbery perpetrated by one armed WIth a <~
.dangerous or deadly weapon, it is not necessary to show that';~
the weapon is deadly so long as it can be shown that it is;:
dangerous; the words "dangerous or deadly" are used inthe';~:.
statute disjunctively aDd are Dot equivalent.
": ;
IlS] Id.-Evldence-DeP'ee of 01fense.-When the weaponin~
volved in first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) is a gun, .
the prosecution need not produce it; testimony by witnesses,
that they saw what looked like a gun, even if they cannot
identify the type or caliber, will suffice.
(14] ld.-Degrees of ltobbe1"f-Dangerolis or Deadl7 WeapoD.-In
a prosecution for first degree robbery, defined under Pen.
Code, § 2lla, as robbery perpetrated by one armed with a '
dangerous or deadly weapon, the prosecution Deed not prove
that the gun with which the robber was armed was loaded or
that it was real; any pistol, even a sh1lrt one may be a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute, since the pistoll
is eapable of being used as a bludgeon.
[15] ld.-Degrees of Bobbe1"f-Dangerous or Deadl7 WeapoD.In a prosecution for first degree robbery, defined under Pen.
Code, § 211a, as robbery perpetrated by one armed with a
dangerous or deadly weapon, the prosecution need not show
that defendant intended to use the weapon with which he
was. armed.
[16] Id.-Instructions-DeP'ee of 01fense.-In a prosecution for
robbery, the jury may be instructed that the crime com-i.
mitted was first degree robbery if it finds that the gun used
by the robber was real, whether loaded or Dot. If the jury ,
finds that the gun was a toy and determines from the circumstances that the toy gun could have been used as a club, the
jury may still find the robbery is of the first degree.
[17] Id.-DeP'ee of Bobbe1"f-Dangerous or Deadly Weapon.Though the definition in Pen. Code, § 3024, subd. (f),' of a
"deadly weapon," which will make an armed robber's minimum sentence four years if he has a prior feloDY conviction,
includes any firearm, whether loaded or not, it does not include,
a toy pistol unless the toy was metal and used or intended
for use as a club.
[18] ld.-Instructions-Degree of 01fense.-In a prosecution for
first degree robbery, defined under Pen. Code, § 211a, as robbery perpetrated by one &fmed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon, if the weapon cannot be found, the jury may be in[12] See Oal.Jur.2d, Robbery, § 13; Am.Jur., Robbery (1st
ed § 4).

'.
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structed that it may infer from the circumstances surrounding
the robbery that the gun was not a toy.
[19] Id.-Evidence-Degree of Offense.-In a prosecution for first
degree robbery, defined by Pen. Code, § 211a, as robbery perpetrated by one armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon,
testimony that defendant flourished a pistol or pointed it at
the victim and used threatening words or conduct, indicating
his intent to fire it if his demands were not met, would be
evidence from which the jury could infer that the pistol was
not a toy.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph A. Wapner, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgments of conviction of first
degree robbery reversed as to one defendant, and reversed
solely on the constitutional ground announced in People v.
Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361] as to
second defendant.
Caryl Warner and Charles Hamel, under appointment by
the Supreme Court, for Defendants and Appellants.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and George J.
Roth, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants appeal from judgments of
conviction entered after a jury found them guilty of robbery
in the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 211a.)
About 4 :30 p. m., July 10, 1962, Louis Luna was watching
television with Betty Holbrook in the back room of his
jewelry store on North Main Street in Los Angeles. Luna
heard the door buzzer and went into the front room of the
store where he saw two men. One was holding what appeared
to be a nickel-plated .25 caliber automatic in one hand and
a lunch box in the other. The gunman ordered Luna to ., put
the money in the box," and when Luna replied that he had
Done, the man told him to give him his keys. He then took
Luna into the back room, tied his hands with a piece of cord,
and forced him to lie face down on the fioor. He ordered Miss
Holbrook to face the wall and then returned to the front of
the store.
•
At this juncture, Alex Salgado entered the shop to have
his watch repaired. He saw the back of one man by the open
safe and another man holding what he thought was a .38 or
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a .45 caliber gun. Salgado could see only the gunman's
since his body was hidden by the safe. The latter pointed
gun at Salgado and spoke to him, and Salgado left,
across the street, and called the police.
Police officers found two fingerprints, later identified
those of defendant Martinez, on a black box containing a
lighter. The men had taken money, new jewelry, several'
customers' watches, and a Smith and Wesson gun. .
.'
About a week later at approximately 2 :30 a.m. PoliCe
Officer Collier and his partner saw Martinez walking along
Emma Street. Officer Collier knew Martinez and offered him .'
a ride, which he accepted. Martinez said. that he was going"
to defendant Aranda's apartment. The officers let him out of '
the car at Lincoln Park Avenue and watched where he went.•
They followed him to Aranda's apartment, where they arrested both defendants. Officer Collier told Martinez that he
had been identified as one of the perpetrators of an armed '
robbery.
.'
In a later search of Aranda's apartment, which he shared
with his mother, the police found three .25 caliber shells in a
bedroom. The gun used in tlle robbery was never found~
Luna was not able to make more than a tentative identifi- '. '
cation of Martinez either at the police lineup or at the trial.
The only other evidence against Martinez was his fingerprints and a confession that he made after a serit's of in1~p.1"'I'O-"'.'iII
gation sessions with the police on Ju]y 17, the day of his ,.'
arrest. Officer Becker testified that Martinez voluntarily
confessed that he and Aranda committed the robbery.l Officer .
Becker, who was alone wiili Martinez at the time, made notes
of ilie conversation but he neither made a tape recording
it nor had Martinez sign a confession.

or

lAt the trial, Officer Beeker related his conversation with Martines
as follows: "Be stated that on the day of the robbery, that on the
lOth of July 1962, that he and Chop Chop, meaning defendant Aranda
had either been working some place or had been looking for work. That
they were on their way home and all of a sudden decided to rob a jewelry
store there at North :Main, Luna's Jewelry Store. Be said that after the
.robbery they had ran [sic) down to Chaleco's Bar where they had sat
,for some time. I asked him if he could recover any of the property,
any of the ~ewelry or the watches or money or the gun. He said no, that .
DB fIlr as he knew, the jewelry had been sold to some fence in East L.A. "
and that the gun had been sold to an unknown male at Chaluo's Ba~•. "
I asked him if he knew why th!: twine or the rope that was used to tie '
Mr. Luna had a sweet smell to it and he said that it was because Chop
Chop used to earry his shaving equipment in his lunch box along with .•~
tlle rope and that at one time the sllaving lotion bad leaked out and made ;.;';~
the rope smell. He then requested not to let Chop Chop know that he had li~
'. admitted the robbery."
-:"j
',~
>~~]
~
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Martinez testified on his own behalf and denied committing
the robbery or making a confession to the police. To explain
the fingerprints in Luna's office, he testified that he had gone
to the shop on several occasions before the robbery and once
while looking for a gift for his cousin, had handled the lighter
and the box on which his fingerprints were found.
[la] At the time of Martinez's confession, the investigation into the robbery had ceased to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and had focused on him and Aranda.
Martinez had been taken into custody and was being interrogated for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.
Nothing in the record indicates that he had been advised of
his rights to counsel and to remain silent or that he had
waived those rights. Under such circumstances, the confession obtained was inadmissible by virtue of the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. (People v. Bilderbach, 62 Ca1.2d 757, 761-762 [44 Ca1.Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d
921] ; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 621-622 [43 Cal.Rptr.
699,401 P.2d 4] ; People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 576-581 [43
Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]; People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d
338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].) [2] Since this case
was tried before the Escobedo decision, Martinez's failure to
object to the admission of the confession into evidence does
not preclude his raising the question on appeal. (People v.
Davis, 62 Ca1.2d 791, 796 [44 Cal.Rptr. 441, 402 P.2d 129J ;
People v. Hillery, 62 Ca1.2d 692, 711 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401
P.2d 382].) [lb] The judgment against defendant Martinez.
must therefore be reversed.
On the day that defendant Aranda was arrested, Luna
and Salgado identified him at a police lineup as one of the
robbers. Both men repeated their identification at the triaP
Luna also stated that the cord used to tie him smelled of
perfume. Aranda testified in his own behalf and denied
committing the robbery. He had never owned a .25 caliber
llicl{el-plated automatic gun and had never seen the bullets
found in his apartment. His mother, however, picked up a
grcat many things and left tllem all over the house. He was
!!Some doubt was cast upon thes~ identifications on cross·examination.
It nppeared that no electric lights were on in the store during tllC rob·
bery. The witnesses in the police report had described the man holding
!hc gUll as younger and hea\'ier than A mllda actually was. TIley had also
Identified him in the r40rt as wC'aring slln glasses and a hat. At trial,
both Luna and Salgado were not at 011 certain whether the man they bad
aeen -during the robbery had or had not worn a hat or sun glasses.
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at Chaleco's Bar late in the afternoon of the day of therobbery where he met Miss Holbrook, with whom he was
slightly acquainted. They left the bar sometime after 8 p.m.
to visit Miss Holbrook's boy friend, Luna. On a corner
opposite the jewelry store, they met Luna and stopped to talk
to him. Luna pointed out the store to Aranda, which was
the first time that Aranda saw it. While the three were talking, a police officer came by and called defendant and Miss
Holbrook aside to talk to them. 8
On rebuttal the prosecution called Aranda's mother, who
testified that she had not brought the bullets into the house
or seen them there. Aranda was also impeached by evidence
of three prior felony convictions and testimony of a police
officer that on the day of his arrest Aranda denied knowing
where the Luna jewelry store was located.
Aranda contends that the error in admitting Martinez's
confession into evidence was also prejudicial to him. The
Attorney General contends that the error did not prejudice
Aranda on the ground that the trial court instructed the
jury on several occasions that the confession was to be considered as evidence only against Martinez, the declarant. To
hold otherwise, he asserts, would be inconsistent with the rule
permitting joint trials in such cases.
This court has consistently held that a joint trial is permissible under Penal Code section 1098 even though the
prosecution has obtained a confession from one defendant
inculpating both defendants and intends to introduce that
confession into evidence (e.g., People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal.2d
503, 532-533 [30 Ca1.Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394]; People v.
Turv£lle, 51 Ca1.2d 620, 636 {335 P.2d 678] ; People v. Perry,
195 Cal. 623, 633 [234 P. 890)). The rationale of these
cases is that a jury will comprehend and apply instructions
to limit the effect of a confession to the particular declarant.
(See People v. Pike, 58 Cal.2d 70, 85 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372
P.2d 656] ; People v. Ohavez, 50 Cal.2d 778, 790 [329 P.2d
907] ; People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 897 [186 P.2d 405].)
In the absence of a showing of some positive act of misconduct

,

aOfficer Howard Friar corroborated a part of Aranda's testimony. He
stated that he had seen Aranda and Miss Holbrook on the corner adjacent to the jewelry store. Later in the evening he had spoken to Luna.
Officer Friar was not asked about any conversation he had with Aranda
or whether he had seen Aranda with Luna. Miss Holbrook was Dot
called by either side. The prosecution claimed that it was useless for it
to eall her, sinee IIhe had atated that she was unable to identify either
of the men who had entered Luna'. store. Counsel for Aranda .aid that
.be had not been called becaulle he was unable to locate her.

1

II
I
I
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it is presumed that the members of the jury performed their
duties with fidelity to their oaths and that they obeyed the
admonitions of the judge. (See People v. Turville, 51 Ca1.2d
620, 636 [335 P.2d 678]; People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319,
332 [273 P.2d 249]; People v. Kramer, 117 Cal. 647, 649650 [49 P. 842].)
In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 [77 S.Ct.
294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278], the Supreme Court of the United
States approved this rule in joint trials in the federal courts.
In justifying its decision, the court said: "It is a basic
premise of our jury system that the court states the law to
the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the
jury finds them. Unles!i we proceed on the basis that the jury
will follow the court's instructions where those instructions
Gre clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can
rensonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes
little sense." (P. 242.)
To some judges, however, the procedure cannot be justified.
It "results in serious impairment of the rights of the accused
to a fair consideration by an impartial jury of the competent
evidence produced against him." (People v. Fisher, 249
N.Y. 419, 428 [164 N.E. 336, 339] [Lehman, J., dissenting] ;
see People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 446-448 [113 N.E.
713, 715-716]; United States v. Delli Paoli (2d Cir.) 229
F.2d 319,322 [Frank, J., dissenting].) It is a "fiction" and
a "naive assumption" about the way juries can function. (See
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 [69 S.Ct. 716, 93
L.Ed. 790] [Jackson, J., concurring); People v. Chambers,
231 Cal.App.2d 23, 33 [41 Cal.Rptr. 551).) The rule calls
upon the jury to perform "a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but awbody's else." (Nash v.
United States (2d Cir.) 54 F.2d ~006, 1007; see Meltzer,
Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility between Judge and Jury, 21 U.Chi.L.Rev. (1954) 317, 326.)
Writing for the four dissenters in Delli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 [77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278], Justice Frankfurter stated: "The fact of the matter is that too often such
admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that
the effect of,such a non admissible declaration cannot be wiped
from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose
as a legal protection to defe~dants against whom such a declaration should not tell. . .. The Government should not have
the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidencp.

.I

\
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against a defendant whicl1, as a mattcr of law, they should
not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds."
(P. 247.) To these critics, the rule is not basic to our jury
system and is not needed to preserve the system. Instead
it is a rule that perverts the jury trial since it calls upon
ordinary lay people to obey an instruetion that every judge
realizes cannot be obeyed. It fosters what one scholar refers
to as our "inconsistent attitude" toward juries. We treat
them" at times as a group of low-grade morons and at other
times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control
their emotions and intellects." (Morgan, Some Problems of
Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation (1956)
p.105.)
[3] Whether or not these criticisms of the present rule
require its abrogation, a question we consider later herein,
they clearly foreelose any assumption that error in admitting
a confession that implicates both defendants is rendered harmless to the nonconfessing defendant by an instruction that it
should not be considered against him. At best, the rule permitting joint trials in such cases is a compromise between
the policies in favor of joint trials and the policies underlying the exclusion of hearsay declarations against one who
did not make them. 4 When, however, the confession implicating both defendants is not admissible at all, there is no
longer room for compromise. The risk of prejudicing the
non confessing defendant can no longer be justified by the
nred for introducing the confession against the one who made
it. Accordingly, we have held that the erroneous admission
into evidence of a confession implicating both defendants
is not necessarily cured by an instruction that it is to be considered only against the declarant. (People v. Gonzales, 136
Cal. 666, 668-669 [69 P. 487] ; see Greenwell v. United States
(D.C. Cir.) 336 F.2d 962, 968-969; People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 151 [243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628] ; People
v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 567 [216 N.Y.S.2d 70,175 N.E.2d
445]; compare People v. Rudish, 294 N.Y. 500 [63 N.E.2d
77] with Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410-412 [65
8.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029].) [4] The giving of such instructions, ho,~ever, and the fact that the confession is only an
4In this compromise the defendant must bear the risk that regardless
of its efforts, the jury may subconsciously merge all the evidence. •• A
man takes some risk in choosing his associates Md, if he is hailed into
court with them, must ordinarily rely on the fairness and ability of the
jury to separate the sheep from the goats." (United States v. Fradkin
•.{2d Cir.) 81 F.2d 56, 59.)
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accusation against the non declarant and thus lacks the shat·
tering impact of a self.incriminatory statement by him (see
People v. Parham, 60 Ca1.2d 378, 385 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 884
P.2d 1001]) preclude holding that the error of admitting the
confession is always prejudicial to the nondeclarant.
[6] In the present case, however, it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to A.randa would have been
reached had Martinez's confession been excluded. The error
therefore resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 4%; People v. Watson,46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d
243] .) There was a direct conflict in the evidence, and both
defendants denied their guilt. In his argument to the jury,
the prosecutor linked the cases of the two defendants together
and in effect urged Martinez's confession as evidence against
Aranda.1I
Since the judgments must be reversed, we consider other
questions that may arise on retrial.
The prosecution may be able to establish that Martinez was
informed of his rights to counsel and to remain silent or that
he waived those rights before he confessed. [Ga] In that
event, Martinez's confession would be admissible and A.randa
might move for a separate trial.IIAfter contending that the ease against Aranda based on identifica·
tions, the finding of cartridges in his home, and his false statement to
the police, was a strong one, the prosecutor stated that ., we have one
other thing. We have a statement made by Mr. Martinez, a statement
made by Mr. Martinez relating to Chaleco's Bar; a statement relating
to how the robbery oecurred, how they went in there, how he was involved." Later the prosecutor stated that in terms of credibility "basi·
cally it is going to boil down to a police officer, Officer Becker, and the
two defendants here." This was repeated when he said, "Now, if you
wish to believe the defendants, you must also--I urge you to consider
this as your credibility. You are saying that the officer is not telling
the truth; you are saying that the officer is lying and these two defendants are the ones who are telling the truth." The jury was told that
"we have a confession or an admission on the part of one of the defendants-that the officer said that :Mr. :Martinez stated that on the way
home they decided to rob Luna's 8~. Afterward-that they robbed
the store, and afterward they ran to Chaleco's Bar." Finally, to give
relevance to Luna's testimony about the odor of the rope used to bind
him, the prosecution stated that :Martinez had admitted that •• the
reason it had a sweet smell is because Chop Chop carried it in his shaving
kit. ' , In view of tJIis summation, it is highly unlikely that the jury
could have disregarded :Martinez's confession when it decided the question
of defendant Aranda's guilt or innocence.
-Defendant Aranda, both in discoverv proceedings and on a motion
for a new trial, contended that he was entitled to see any memoranda
that the police had of !!Xtrajudieial statements made by :Martinez. Although the record is unclear as to the actual existence of such memoranda, the trial court erred in holding that, in any event, Aranda was
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It is contended that it is a denial of due process to admit
into evidence at a joint trial the confession of one defendant
inculpating a codefendant even though the jury is instructed
that the confession is not to be considered against the codefendant. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 S.Ct. 1774,
12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R. 3d 1205], the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant was constitutionally entitled to
have a trial judge or possibly a separate jury determine that
his confession was voluntary before it was submitted to the
trial jury for an assessment of its credibility. The court did
not believe that a jury could separate the issue of the voluntariness of an extrajudicial statement from the issue of its
truth. "If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency
of the other evidence, does the jury unconsciously lay them
to rest by resort to the confession' Will uncertainty about
the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the jury
knows the defendant has given a truthful confession.
"It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession
which a jury has found to be involuntary has nevertheless
influenced the verdict or that its finding of voluntariness, if
this is the course it took, was affected by other evidence showing the confession was true. " (Pp. 388-389.) It quoted from
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli to the effect that a
jury should not be permitted to be influenced by evidence
against a defendant that as a matter of law they cannot consider but as a matter of fact they cannot disregard, and cited
Morgan, Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American
System of Litigation (1956) pages 104-105, to the same effect.
Although Jackson was directly concerned with obviating
any risk that a jury might rely on an unconstitutionally
obtained confession in determining the defendant's guilt,
its logic extends to obviating the risks that the jury may rely
on any inadmissible statements. If it is a denial of due process
to rely ona jury's presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of due process to rely
on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a codefendant's

,

not entitled to discover statements made by Martinez. [6b] As a prelim·
inary to a joint trial, one defendant is entitled to the statements made to
the police by any codefendant. (SeE' generally People v. Gamer, 57 Cal.2d
135, 142 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680): Funk v. Superior Court, 52
Cal.2d 423,424 [340 P.2d 593].) Without such information, a defendant,
such as Aranda, would be unable to take the steps needed to insure that
the confessions of his codefendants would be used only to incriminate
those who made the statements.

'
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confession implicating another defendant when it is determining that defendant's guilt or innocence.'
Indeed, the latter task may be an even more difficult one
for the jury to perform than the former. Under the New
York procedure, which Jackson held violated due process,
the jury was only required to disregard a confession it found
to be involuntary. If it made such a finding, then the confession
was presumably out of. the case. In joint trials, however,
when the admissible confession of one defendant inculpates
another defendant, the confession is never deleted from the
case and the jury is expected to perform the overwhelming
task of considering it in determining the guilt or innocence
of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining the
guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the declarant. A
jury cannot "segregate evidence into separate intellectual
boxes. " (PeopZe v. Chambe,.s, 231 Cal.App.2d 23, 33 [41
Cal.Rptr. 551].) It cannot determine that a confession is
true insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal
acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has committed those same criminal
acts with A.
In section 1098 of the Penal Code, the Legislature, while
providing that the courts might order separate trials for defendants jointly charged with any public offense, left to the
courts the determination of standards governing such severances. [7&] The grave constitutional doubts 8 engendered by
'''Because of these close parallels between Jackson and Delli' Paoli,
Jack80n may foreshadow a holding that the Delli Paoli procedure violates
due process." (78 Han.L.Rev. 211, 213 j see People v. Clark, 62 Cal.2d
870, 885, fn. 13 [44 Cal.Rptr. 784, 402 P.2d 856].)
8In Pointer v. TuGS, 880 U.S. 400 [85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923J,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of II. defendant's right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him" including the right to cross· examine these
witnesses applicable to the states. More specifically, it found that when
the prosecution in a· criminal trial introduced the prior testimony of a
witness who had not been subject to effective cross·examination at a
preliminary hearing where this testimony was taken, defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated. The court quoted with
approval from Tllrner v. L/)1l,iaiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473 [85 S.Ct_ 546,
18 L.Ed.2d 424]: "In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal ease necessarily implies at the very least that the I evidence developed' against a defendant shan come from the witness stand in a public
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's
right of confrontation, of cross-examination and of counsel." In reaching its decision that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation
applies to trials in state courts, the court noted that any statements to
the contrary in We8t v. L/)1l,iaiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264 [24 S.Ct. 650, 43
L.Ed. 965], and in Stein v. New YOf'7i:, 846 U.S. 156, 195-196 [73 S.Ct.
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our present practice of permitting joint trials when the confession of one defendant implicates codefendants has prompted
our reconsideration of this practice. Whether or not it is
constitutionally permissible, the practice is prejudicial and
unfair to the nondeclarant defendant and must be altered.
[8] "[I]n criminal actions, where life or liberty is at stake,
. courts should not adhere to precedents unjust to the accused.
It is never too late to mend." (U",itea States v. Delli Paoli
(2d Oir.) 229F.2d 319, 323 [Frank, .J., dissenting].)
[7b] In the absence, however, of a holding by the United
States Supreme Court that the due process clause requires
stich change, the rules we now adopt are to be regarded, not
as constitutionally compelled, but as judicially declared rules
of practice to implement section 1098.8
[9] When the prosecution proposes to introduce into evidence an extrajudicial statement of. one defendant that implicates a codefendant, tbe trial court must adopt one of the
following procedures: (1) It can permit a joint trial if all
parts of the' extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants can be and are effectively deleted without prejudice
to the declarant. By effective deletions, we mean not only
direct and indirect identifications of codefendants but any
statements that could be employed against nondeclarant codefendants once their identity is otherwise established.10
1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522], could no longer be regarded as law. In SteiA, the
court found that the right of confrontation W88 not binding on the
states and a1Iirmed the conviction of a defendant who had been im·
plicated by the confessions of his codefendants. The confessions had
been admitted with the instruction that tbey were to be considered only
against their respective deelarants.
. It is not clear wbat other procedural practices Pointer precludes. It
at least casts further doubt, however, on any rule that purports to cure
an encroachment on tbe right to confrontation by an instruction to tbe
jury to disregard inadmissible bearsay evidence. (See generally Salinger
v. United State., 272 U.S. 542, 548 [47 S.Ct. 173,11 L.Ed. 398]; Kir'bll
v. United 8tote., 174 U.S. 47, 55 (19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890].)
tlIn justification of joint trials it has been pointed out that they con·
serve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnssses and public au·
thorities, and avoid delays in the punishing of the guilty. These practical
considerations of convenience must be subordinated. when they run
counter to 'the need to insure fair trials and to protect fundamental
constitutional rights. (See Kottea'kos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
773 £66 S.Ot. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557]; Schaffer v. United Statrs, 362 U.S.
511, 522-523 (80 S.Ct. 954, 4 L.Ed.2d 921J (Douglas, J., dissenting].)
lOThe rulescoveruing the cases in which deletion would be a permis·
sible I1ltemativ\ cannot be set out fully. Use of tlle procedure would
depend on the evidence linking the defendants together before and after
tIle crime and on the al'tual statements made by tllC declarant defendant.
In the present ease, deletion would bave been an effective solution to
the joint trial problem. All that Martinez's confession added to the
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(2) It can grant a severance of trials if the prosecution insists that it must use the extrajudicial statements and it appears that effective deletions cannot be made. (3) If the
prosecution has successfully resisted a motion for severance
and thereafter offers an extrajudicial statement implicating
a codefendant, the trial court must exclude it if effective deletions are not possible. Similar rules concerning joint trial
have been adopted in other jurisdictions and have been found
workable. (See, e.g., State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58 [101 A.
476]; People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264 {69 N.E.2d 692]; People
v. Bolton, 339 Ill. 225 [171 N.E. 152]; State v. Rosen, 151
Ohio St. 339 [86 N.E.2d 24].)
[10] Defendant Aranda objects to the introduction into
evidence of proof of two prior felony convictions. On March
ao, 1955, he was convicted of violating section 503 of the
Vehicle Code, and on March 21, 1957, of violating section
11500 of the Health and Safety Code. After these convictions,
he was committed to the California Youth Authority. Section
17 of the Penal Code then provided in part: "Where a court
commits a defendant to the California Youth Authority upon
conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison or fine or imprisonment in a county jail, in the discretion of the court, the crime shall be deemed a felony until
and unless the court, after the person . . . has been discharged
. . . makes an order determining that the crime of which he
was convicted was a misdemeanor." Aranda does not contend
that, after his discharge from the Youth Authority, he made
application for or obtained court orders determining ihat the
crimes of which he had been convicted were misdemeanors. In
1959, section 17 was amended (Stats. 1959, ch. 532, at p. 2499)
so that it now reads: "Where a court commits a defendant to
the Youth Authority upon conviction of a crime punishable,
in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state
prison or fine or imprisonment in a county jail, the crime
shall be deemed a misdemeanor. "
There is no merit in Aranda's contention that this amendment must be given a retroactive application and that if it
is only applied prospectively, he will be deprived of due
ease against Aranda was Aranda's identity. No evidence linked the two
together at any other time relevant to the commission of the robbery.
Deleting all references to Aranda wquld not have prejudiced Martinez
and what remained would have preJudiced Aranda no more than if
Martinez had in fact said that "I was one of the persons who robbed
the store but I will tell you nothing more."
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process of law and of the equal protection of the law. Section
3 of the Penal Code provides that «'No part of it is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." (See also Douglas Aircraft Co.
v. Cranston, 58 Ca1.2d 462, 465 [24 Ca1.Rptr. 851, 374 P.2d
819]; Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.211
488,494 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325].) The amendment
to section 17 does not so declare. (See PeopZe v. Zaccaria,
216 Cal.App.2d 787 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 383]; People v. Gotham,
185 Cal.App.2d 47 [8 Cal.Rptr. 20].) [11] A refusal to
apply a statute retroactively does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Both defendants contend that the evidence does not support
:findings that they were guilty of first degree robbery or
that they were armed with a deadly weapon. [12] Section
211aof the Penal Code provides that robbery "perpetrated
. . . by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon" is robbery in the :first degree. The words "dangerous or deadly" are used disjunctively and are not equivalents. (See PeopZe v. Seawright, 72 Cal.App. 414, 419 [237
P. 796] ; State v. Lynch, 88 Me. 195, 197-198 [33 A. 978, 979].)
Thus, it is not necessary to show that the weapon is deadly
so long as it can be shown that it is dangerous. (People v.
Coleman, 53 Cal.App.2d 18, 28 [127 P.2d 309].) [IS] When
the weapon involved is a gun, the prosecution need not produce it. Testimony by witnesses who state that they saw what
looked like a gun, even if they cannot identify the type or
caliber, will suffice. (People v. MiUer, 190 Ca1.App.2d 361,
364 [11 Cal.Rptr. 920] ; People v. Mack, 171 Cal.App.2d 631,
632 [341 P.2d 334]; People v. Billingsley, 161 Cal.App.2d
247, 250-251 [326 P.2d 642].) [14] The prosecution does
not have to prove either that the gun was loaded (People v.
Raleigh, 128 Cal.App. 105, 108 [16 P.2d 752] ; People v. Egan,
77 Cal.App. 279, 284 [246 P. 337]) or that it was real (People
v. Ward, 84 Ca1.App.2d 357, 360 [190 P.2d 972]). Any pistol,
even a short one, may be a" dangerous" weapon within the
meaning of the statute since it is capable of being used as a
bludgeon. (See People v. Hood, 160 Cal.App.2d 121, 122
[324 P.2d 656].) [16] It is not necessary to show that defendant intended to use it. (PeopZe v. Raleigh, 128 Ca1.App.
105, 110 [16 'P.2d 752].) [16] A jury may be instructed
that if it :finds that the gun was real, whether loaded or not,
then the crime committed is robbery in the :first degree. If it
:finds that the gun was a toy, it may still:find that the robbery
is of the :first degree if it determines from the circumstances
that the toy gun could have been used as a club.
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[17] Section 3024, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code provides that a person with a prior felony convietion is subjeet
to a minimum sentenee of four years if at the time of the
offense he was "armed with a deadly weapon." The disjunetive word" dangerous" is not used, but the words ., deadly
weapon" are defined in subdivision (f) to inelude "any ..•
pistol, revolver, or any other firearm . . . and any metal
pipe or bar used or intended to be used as a club.• ! Although
this definition includes any firearm whether loaded or not, it
does not include a toy pistol unless the toy was made of metal
and was "used or intended to be used as a club." [18] If the
weapon cannot be found, the jury may be instrueted by the
court that it may draw an inference from the circumstances
surrounding the robbery that the gun was not a toy. [19] Testimony to the effect that the defendant was flourishing the pistol
or pointing it at the victim and was using threatening words
or conduct indicating that he intended to fire it if his demands
were not met would be evidence from which the inference
could be drawn. (Cf. People v. Newman, 102 Ca1.App.2d 302,
306-307 [227 P.2d 470]; People v. Seawright, 72 Ca1.App.
414, 419 [237 P. 796].)
Since other questions raised are not likely to arise on retrial,
we need not decide them here.
The judgments are reversed.

Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and White, J.,.
concurred.
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
reversal of the judgment as to defendant Martinez. I would
affirm the judgment as to defendant Aranda.

*Retired Assooiate Justice of the Supreme Court aittinl lUlder assign.
ment by the Chairml\J\ of the Judicial Council.

